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# ALLIANCE OF BARBARITIES

AFGHANISTAN 2001-2008  
10 REASONS TO QUESTION  
(AND RETHINK) FOREIGN  
INVOLVEMENT



# REPORT

JUSTIÇA I PAU  
CENTRE D'ESTUDIS  
PER A LA PAU  
JMDELÀS

Number 4

## ALLIANCE OF BARBARITIES AFGHANISTAN 2001-2008. 10 REASONS TO QUESTION (AND RETHINK) FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

Alejandro Pozo Marín  
Barcelona, December 2008

### Introduction

Until September 11, 2001, Afghanistan had not been on the foreign policy agendas of the countries of the world. The terrorist attacks in the United States traumatized a part of the world's population and increased perceptions of external threat and polarization between the West and the Muslim world.

September 11 gave Afghanistan a huge role but this Western obsession with the country has not been reflected in any improvement in living conditions for the local population, and trends suggest consequences as disastrous as those experienced in the two decades prior to the military intervention that began on October 7, 2001. For this reason, the appropriateness of the deployment of international troops in the country in its present format is being called into question more and more.

We at Justice and Peace's J. M. Delàs Centre for Peace Studies have been observing events with great concern. We feel that the intentions behind the intervention are neither honourable nor sincere because the rhetoric surrounding foreign military operations and Spain's in particular do not appear compatible with facts on the ground. Accordingly, we have prepared this report in which we offer 10 reasons we are questioning foreign involvement in Afghanistan. These doubts have convinced us of the need for the withdrawal of Spanish troops and a rethinking of Spanish foreign policy in relation to Afghanistan. The implication

is a rejection of Spanish military participation and a call for a real commitment by the Spanish government to working with the population through civilian and diplomatic means in accordance with the specific nature of this Central Asian country.

While we do not wish to give equal weight to all 10 reasons, each and every one raises concerns that need to be debated. At the same time our criticism is not directed at the interests Western countries, most notably the United States, may have in Afghanistan. Our assessment of the situation focusses on the well-being or lack of it foreign intervention may mean for the Afghan population. The impact can be looked at from two different perspectives: the effects Western actions have produced (principally in military terms) and the opportunities wasted through inaction in other areas (in civilian terms).

The Spanish government must be held accountable for its actions, its collaboration with the actions of other countries, the discrepancy between words and actions, and we need to ask whether Spain's actions in Afghanistan help make the world more just and Afghanistan more prosperous, and whether this is the best it can do. Our feeling is that it is not, and for this reason we want to bring arguments to the debate in the hope that they make a contribution to improving relations between the Spanish government and the population of Afghanistan.

**Map of Afghanistan. Source: United Nations**



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## CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

<b>1933 – 1973</b>	Relatively stable monarchy with foreign relations leaning toward the USSR
<b>1973-78</b>	Coup d'état, republic in the non-aligned bloc with a certain leaning toward the USA
<b>1978-79</b>	Series of regimes and coups d'état. Tension between Afghan tradition, Soviet policies, Western policies, regional powers
<b>1979</b>	Soviet occupation
<b>1980-1988</b>	War between the USSR and Afghanistan (mujahideen, support of countries including Pakistan and the USA)
<b>1989</b>	Withdrawal of Soviet troops
<b>1989 – 1992</b>	Pro-Soviet regime
<b>1992 – 1996</b>	Internal fighting among various groups (later on almost all would join the Northern Alliance or more precisely the United Front). They move in and out of the various coalition governments. Great destruction in Kabul, great violence
<b>1996 – 2001</b>	Taliban control of Afghanistan
<b>07 Oct 2001</b>	Operation Infinite Justice, renamed Enduring Freedom
<b>26 Nov 2001</b>	Northern Alliance takes control of Kabul
<b>Dec 2001</b>	Bonn Process. Formation of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA)
<b>Jan 2002</b>	Deployment of ISAF
<b>21 Jan 2002</b>	Initial donors' conference in Tokyo
<b>28 Mar 2002</b>	Creation of the United Nations Aid Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
<b>11 Jun 2002</b>	Opening of the Loya Jirga (Great Assembly)
<b>Dec 2002</b>	Hamid Karzai and the Presidents of Pakistan and Turkmenistan sign an accord to construct a pipeline through Afghanistan to transport gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan
<b>Aug 2003</b>	NATO takes control of ISAF
<b>Jan 2004</b>	Loya Jirga – new constitution
<b>Oct 2004</b>	Presidential elections won by Karzai (with 55% of the vote)
<b>Dec 2005</b>	Opening of new parliament
<b>Feb 2006</b>	Donor conference in London
<b>Oct 2006</b>	NATO takes control of ALL of Afghanistan

*Operation  
Infinite Justice,  
later renamed  
Enduring Freedom,  
begins on  
7 October 2001*



**Operation Enduring Freedom**  
(originally called Infinite Justice)

**General**

<b>Period</b>	<b>7 October 2001 – present</b>
<b>Number of troops deployed<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>18,000</b> , great majority from the US. Other countries currently participating are: United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, France (860 soldiers in 2007), Canada (284), New Zealand (107), Rumania (94), Czech Republic (35) and the Netherlands (6). <sup>2</sup> In addition to the Enduring Freedom troops and the some 20,000 in the parallel ISAF operation, the USA has <b>another 10,550 reservists</b> , deployed in Afghanistan but not active. <sup>3</sup> President Obama has indicated that he will increase the US contingent by 30,000 new troops, most likely in the summer of 2009. <sup>4</sup>
<b>Legal Situation</b>	Operation <b>NOT</b> expressly <b>authorized</b> by the UN Security Council. It has from the start been an <b>act contrary to international law</b> .
<b>Participation</b>	Combat and intelligence operations aimed at search and capture of Taliban militants and members of Al Qaeda and the like.
<b>Cost (USA only)</b>	<b>158,700 - 466,323 million dollars<sup>5</sup></b>


**Spain<sup>6</sup>**

<b>Period</b>	Official: <b>January 2002 – July 2004</b> Real: <b>October 2001 – ?</b>	
<b>Maximum number of troops deployed simultaneously</b>	<b>548</b> (in addition to officers deployed in Tampa, <sup>7</sup> Florida, in November 2001)	
<b>Types of participation<sup>8</sup></b>	The Government allowed <b>38 ships</b> into the Rota Naval Base, and US aircraft have stopped over at the Spanish bases at <b>Morón and Rota</b> as part of their bombing campaign in the first quarter of 2001. <b>Two frigates, a supply ship and a P-3 Orion aircraft</b> on patrol on the <b>Horn of Africa</b> (coast of Djibouti and Somalia) in 2002, supposedly searching for persons with links to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In Bagram (Afghanistan): a <b>field hospital</b> (42 soldados in Deployment Support Medical Unit), <b>various C-130's (Hercules)</b> and <b>four helicopters</b> . Aznar placed three army units at US disposal, Bush declined the offer.	
<b>Spanish fatalities</b>	<b>2</b> (caused by heart attacks)	
<b>Total cost of Spanish participation</b> (in euros, paid by the Spanish Government) <sup>9</sup>	2002	90,752,000
	2003	71,716,112
	2004	35,242,314
	2005	87,930
<b>Total:</b>	2002 - 2005	<b>197,798,356 euros</b>




**International Military Casualties Afghanistan (ISAF + Enduring Freedom):<sup>10</sup>**

*(It is not possible to obtain data separating out the casualties in the two operations, most likely because they cannot in fact be separated)*



**Enduring Freedom from the US perspective:<sup>11</sup>**



*The military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are both part of a single strategic plan being implemented under the leadership of the United States*

**Costs for the United States of the War on Terrorism (in billions of dollars):<sup>12</sup>**

Operation	2001-02	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2001-08
Iraq	0.0	53.0	75.9	85.5	101.7	133.6	149.2	598.9
<b>Enduring Freedom</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>14.7</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>158.7</b>
Improvements in security	13.0	8.0	3.7	2.1	0.8	0.5	0.2	28.3
Not localized	0.0	5.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>33.8</b>	<b>81.1</b>	<b>94.1</b>	<b>107.6</b>	<b>121.5</b>	<b>171.0</b>	<b>182.1</b>	<b>791.4</b>

Germany	28
Australia	7
Canada	106
South Korea	1
Denmark	21
Spain	25
United States	630
Estonia	3
Finland	1
France	23
The Netherlands	18
Hungary	2
Italy	13
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Norway	3
Poland	8
Portugal	2
United Kingdom	137
Czech Republic	3
Rumania	8
Sweden	2
<b>Total:</b>	<b>1043</b>

*((International sources do not consider the 62 deaths among the Spanish contingent in the crash of a Yak-42 at Trabzon, Turkey as victims of the Afghanistan conflict))*



## ISAF

(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN)

### International troops deployed<sup>13</sup>

23,220: USA  
 8,910: United Kingdom  
 3,405: Germany  
 2,890: France  
 2,830: Canada  
 2,350: Italy  
 1,770: The Netherlands  
 1,590: Poland  
 1,090: Australia  
 800: Turkey  
**780: Spain**  
 770: Rumania  
 700: Denmark  
 490: Norway  
 465: Bulgaria  
 415: Czech Republic  
 410: Belgium  
 290: Sweden  
 280: Croatia  
 240: Hungary  
 200: Lithuania

Others: 1,211  
 (8 countries with  
 10 soldiers or less)

**Total**  
 (January 2009):  
**55,100 from 41 countries**

### General

<b>Participation</b>	<b>January 2002 – present</b>
<b>Type of operation</b>	Operation led by <b>NATO</b> since <b>August 2003</b> (first operation outside the Euro-Atlantic region, in accordance with a Security Council resolution)
<b>Number of troops currently deployed</b>	<b>55,100 troops</b> (and rising), <b>from 41 countries</b> (26 NATO, 15 others)
<b>Legal status</b>	<b>Operation authorized by the UN through Security Council Resolution 1386</b> , passed on 20 December 2001. Authorization extended, the first time for six months and every year thereafter.

### Spain<sup>14</sup>

<b>Deployment of Spanish troops</b>	<b>Kabul</b> (19 soldiers); PRT at <b>Qala-e-Naw</b> (Badghis Province, 232); advanced support base at <b>Herat</b> (436); training base at <b>Camp Stone</b> (51); 63 additional troops at the <b>Manas Air Base</b> (Kirghizstan)		
<b>Maximum number of troops</b>	<b>1,087</b> (deployed at one time)		
<b>Current number of troops</b>	<b>801</b>		
<b>Spanish fatalities</b>	<b>87</b> (62 in a plane crash, 17 in a helicopter crash, 1 in an accident on the ground, 1 resulting from a heart attack and 6 through explosives)		
<b>Total cost of Spanish participation</b> (in euros) paid by the Spanish Government	2002	<b>0</b>	In 2002 costs for ISAF were assigned to Enduring Freedom
	2003	<b>20,816,426</b>	
	2004	<b>102,570,869</b>	
	2005	<b>223,629,915</b>	
	2006	<b>272,351,709</b>	
	2007	<b>266,755,000</b>	
	11/2008	<b>305,382,000</b>	
<b>Total:</b>	<b>2002 – 11/2008</b>	<b>1,191,505,919 euros</b>	


The **Colombian army** is expected to reinforce the Spanish contingent at Qala-e-Naw with approximately 100 troops. Colombia would be the first Latin American countries to supply send troops, with Spain to provide training, infrastructure and equipment. Colombia aim is, in addition to strengthening its alliance with the US, is to reinforce its image in its confrontation with the FARC in the context of the worldwide war on terrorism.<sup>15</sup>

The Afghan army maintains no permanent presence in Badghis Province. As Spain as Spain wants this presence close to its Provincial Reconstruction Team in Qala-e-Naw, **it will provide 14.5 million euros to fund the installation of an Afghan army unit** (including construction of the base, equipment, training and other expenses).<sup>16</sup> The location of the Spanish PRT is likely to be changed.

### Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's)

**Advanced support bases**  
 Kandahar (multinational)  
 Herat (Spain)  
 Mazar-e-Sharif (Germany)  
 Bagram (USA)

The PRT's are military bases (50-200 troops) in theory set up to allow groups of soldiers and civilians (5-10% of the latter) to carry out reconstruction activities, but they are also part of the general military structure and play a role in the image of the foreign armies and in the gathering of information and intelligence.



- PRT's**
- Kandahar (Canada)
  - Lashkar-Gah (UK)
  - Tarin Kowt (Netherlands)
  - Qalat (USA)
  - Heart (Italy)
  - Farah (USA)
  - Qala-e-Naw (Spain)
  - Chaghcharan (Lithuania)
  - Mazar-e-Sharif (Sweden)
  - Feyzabad (Germany)
  - Konduz (Germany)
  - Pol-e-Khomri (Hungary)
  - Meymana (Norway)
  - Logar (Czech Republic)
  - Sharana (USA)
  - Khost (USA)
  - Mether Lam (USA)
  - Bamiyan (New Zealand)
  - Panjshir (USA)
  - Jalalabad (USA)
  - Ghazni (USA)
  - Asadabad (USA)
  - Bagram (USA)
  - Nuristan (USA)
  - Wardak (Turkey)
  - Gardez (USA)

### ISAF MANDATE

The only resolutions establishing the mandate are 1386 (20 December 2001) and 1510 (13 October 2003, which authorize the operation outside Kabul), the remainder simply extend the authorization.<sup>17</sup>

**No authorization expressly authorizes international troops to carry out reconstruction, opium control or counterinsurgency tasks.**

**Resolution 1386 (2001):<sup>18</sup>**  
 Authorizes «an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in **Kabul and its surrounding areas**, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the manpower of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment;» [bolding mine].

**Resolution 1510 (2003):<sup>19</sup>**  
 Authorizes ISAF «to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of **Kabul and its environs**, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement» [bolding mine].

*The ISAF...*

*is not the product of a peace process, but of an agreement among victorious factions*

*...is not a peacekeeping operation*

*...is not a UN operation (these are not Blue Helmets)!*

**UNAMA**  
(UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN)



**Framework**<sup>20</sup>

Authorization	Established on 28 March 2002 through Security Council Resolution 1401, Bonn Accord
Manpower	Total: <b>1362</b> (80% Afghans)

**UNAMA MANDATE**<sup>21</sup>

Originally designed to support reconstruction and national reconciliation, since 23 March 2006 it has been assigned entrusted with giving of political and strategic advice; the promotion of good practices in dispute mediation; aiding the Government in implementing the directives set out at the London Conference (2006); promoting human rights; giving technical assistance, and administering UN humanitarian, recovery, reconstrucción and development activities, in coordination with the Government.

The very limited economic and human resources set aside for UNAMA are a clear demonstration of how little attention civilian issues in Afghanistan attract in the West. And while UNAMA is an eminently civilian mission, it has had to take on the Desarming, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants process.

**EUROPOL**  
(EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN)



**Basic Facts**<sup>23</sup>

Authorization	Joint Action of the EU Council 2007/369/CFSP, of 30 May 2007
Start	15 June (period of three years)
Budget	43,6 million euros
Manpower	274 (184 international and 90 local)

**International Personnel Deployed**<sup>22</sup>


- 33: Germany
- 14: Italy
- 12: United Kingdom
- 11: Spain**
- 10: Canada
- 7: Denmark
- 4: Finland
- 4: Rumania
- 3: The Netherlands
- 3: Hungary
- 3: Poland
- 2: Croatia
- 2: Lithuania
- 2: Norway
- 2: Czech Republic
- 1: Estonia
- 1: France

**EUPOL'S AFGHANISTAN'S MANDATE**

According to the EU, the objective is «contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system». The operative's aim is to bring together various private initiatives such as the German Police Project Office (GPPO) under the EU's aegis. The activities consist of developing joint policing strategies with the Ministry of the Interior (for example criminal investigation, border policy and national strategies).

EUPOL's mandate includes active coordination with other international entities,

explicitly included are ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. It is made up of police and legal experts deployed at the national (Kabul), regional (in the five police commands) and EUPOL's mandate includes active coordination with other international entities, explicitly included are ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. It is made up of police and legal experts deployed at the national (Kabul), regional (in the five police commands) and provincial levels. At the provincial level, activities are carried out by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's). Despite the fact that EUPOL's field of action extends over the country, it is deployed in only 15 of Afghanistan's provinces and is not present in any of the 11 provinces where the US PRT's are to found.



## THE WAR ON TERRORISM

### The importance of remembering how it all started

One needs to keep in mind just what arguments were used to justify military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001. While Spain used arguments like the situation of women, opium production and the plight of the Afghan people, we need to recall that the principal justification was the capture of the Al-Qaeda members and the shutting down of their bases. This was what the US media claimed in 2001 and the same argument is still being used today. Spain's Minister of Defence has stated that Afghanistan represents a threat to the security of Spanish families.<sup>24</sup> The US has from the outset made it clear it did not to participate in any reconstruction of the country.<sup>25</sup> The alleged terrorists captured have been confined to the base at Guantanamo. The status of the almost 800 people detained since 11 January 2002 was according to Amnesty International as follows (as of November 2007):<sup>26</sup>

- Some 300 individuals from approximately 30 countries were still under detention without charges or trial; at least 4 were minors at the time of their detention. It is believed that almost 80% were in isolation, some confined for at least 22 hours a day in individual steel cells without windows to the

outside. At least 4 had committed suicide and dozens had attempted to do so.

- Only 3 detainees had been charged (and held for trial by a military tribunal).

- Some 470 detainees had been released to other countries since 2002.

- Only one detainee had been found guilty (by a military committed in March 2007). David Hicks pled guilty to «providing military support for terrorism» under an agreement arrived at prior to the trial which guaranteed him, following five years of detention, repatriation to his country, Australia to serve nine years in prison.

- The number of those being held secretly by the CIA is unknown. Some have been held incomunicado without due process (at locations in over 10 countries) for periods of up to four and a half years before being transferred to Guantanamo. The situation of at least 36 persons is unknown.

- Hundreds of people are still being held without charges, trial or any judicial review at the US air base at Bagram, Afghanistan.

*Where are the «terrorists» who were being looked for in Afghanistan?*

*How is it that the war on terrorism is still being used as an argument?*

*How is the relationship with the Muslim world and mutual perceptions?*

**The war in Afghanistan: war on terrorism or an increase in terrorism?**



# 1. NATO-ISAF LEGITIMATES ENDURING FREEDOM, AN OPERATION THAT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW.

A military operation against another state **can only be legal if ...**<sup>27</sup>



... it is **expressly authorized** by the UN Security Council

... it is an **act of legitimate defence**

**Operation Enduring Freedom has not been expressly authorized by any UN Security Council Resolution**

**The argument of legitimate defence is not applicable because the main criteria that apply were not met**

## IS THERE ANY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE OPERATION?

■ The position of the Spanish Government: «the mandate for Operation Enduring Freedom is supported by UN Security Council Resolution **1368** of 12 September 2001 regarding international terrorism».<sup>28</sup>

■ Both Resolution 1368 and Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) show a certain (surely intentionally) ambiguity but in no way authorize Enduring Freedom.<sup>29</sup> They ask UN member states for progress in the fight against international terrorism. In any event, the UN Charter clearly sets out that when authorizing armed violence a pronouncement must be clear.

## IT THIS AN ACT OF LEGITIMATE DEFENCE?

■ The Governments of the **United States** and the **United Kingdom** on 7 October 2001 the date of the start of Enduring Freedom sent two letters to the Chairman of the Security Council stating that the war served a preventive purpose.<sup>30</sup> (Preventive warfare is prohibited by the UN Charter.)

■ On October 18 of that year, **José María Aznar**, Spain's head of government, and **José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero**, then leader of the opposition, both stated that the attacks had been carried out in legitimate defence.<sup>31</sup>

## Criterion of legitimate defense:

Principle	Arguments against
<b>Necessity</b> (danger of further attacks)	The US attack took place <b>26 days after the original attack</b> which makes it more of a reprisal than a defence. <sup>32</sup>
<b>Provisionality</b> (when the Security Council takes measures, the right to a unilateral defence ceases.)	The resolutions passed in September constituted action by the Security Council. Does this not authorize ISAF to take measures? After seven years, is the US still defending itself?
<b>Proportionality</b> (Defensive attacks will be launched against those carrying out the original attacks )	Even if the connections between those carrying out the September 11 attacks and Bin-Laden and the latter with the Taliban were clearly proven, providing support or sanctuary is not the equivalent of an armed attack, according to the 1986 finding by the International Court of Justice which stated that US support for <i>la contra</i> was not the equivalent of an armed attack against Nicaragua.

*The UN Security Council has followed a policy of connivence with an operation that violates international law in not condemning it and in recognizing it in legal texts, indeed applauding the coordination of Enduring Freedom with other operations in Afghanistan*

## CONNIVENCE OF THE UN?

■ Some more recent UN resolutions extending Security Council authorization for ISAF ask for its collaboration with Enduring Freedom troops. Nevertheless it is important to keep it mind that this does not change the fact that the latter is contrary to international law.

■ In September 2008 Russia declared in the Security Council that Enduring Freedom was operating outside the UN framework. The Council's report stated that.<sup>33</sup> In any case, the texts of Security Council reports are not binding.

## IS ISAF AN ABSOLUTELY LEGAL OPERATION?

■ The links between ISAF and Enduring Freedom, i.e. between an authorized operation and a not expressly authorized operation (indeed their integration), could make both a military intervention that violates international law.

■ The fact that ISAF has not limited its action to tasks it has been authorized to carry out, calls its legality into question; the different Security Council resolutions **do not authorize** ISAF for example to carry out reconstruction tasks, combat terrorists or eradicate the raising of opium poppies).

**Eduardo Melero:**<sup>34</sup> The intervention in Afghanistan is, for NATO, an operation outside its area. In 1999, NATO extended its area of operation to the entire planet and to operations beyond legitimate defence. «Thus the North Atlantic Treaty was completely changed without a comma in the original text being changed. From the standpoint of the Spanish legal

system, the literal text of the North Atlantic Treaty prevails, so that **any NATO military interventions that go beyond what is set out in Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty must be considered illegal**. Art. 94.1.b. of the Spanish Constitution requires that modification of the North Atlantic Treaty obtain the prior authorization of the Spanish Parliament, and the signing of the NATO New Strategic Concept has not received such an authorization». [bolding of the text is mine].

«The Spanish Government has not signed any international treaty covering its participation in ISAF but has merely signed a memorandum of agreement. This Memorandum violates Art. 94.1.b. of the Spanish Constitution which requires prior authorization by the Spanish Parliament for signing treaties or agreements of a military nature. No request for prior authorization as is required by Article 63.3. of the Constitution has been sent to the Parliament».<sup>35</sup>

***Seven years of holding alleged Al-Qaeda terrorists at Guantanamo without charges or trial while subjecting them to grave violations of their human rights represent a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. The lack of international measures to deal with this issue is unacceptable***

## 2. THE TWO MILITARY OPERATIONS (ENDURING FREEDOM AND ISAF) ARE PART OF THE SAME LOGIC

*Reports by the US Congress do not make any distinction statistically or logically between Enduring Freedom and ISAF and refer to the whole as Enduring Freedom Afghanistan*

### HOW ARE ISAF AND ENDURING FREEDOM INTEGRATED?

One cannot conceive of ISAF without Enduring Freedom. In fact, the creation of the former was a consequence of attempts to provide legitimacy to the latter. Nevertheless, as ISAF has taken over control of more territory in Afghanistan, Enduring Freedom has been integrated into ISAF, and the latter has been made more and more responsible for Enduring Freedom's PRT's. The initial plan for a merger of the two military operations has ended up as a process of integration. In any case, the then Spanish Minister of Defence José Bono stated that the Spanish Government would not have opposed a merger between Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF.<sup>36</sup>


■ Gaspar Llamazares (Left/Green Group): «These are the words of the Spanish Ambassador in Afghanistan. He says, What we are seeing is not a possible merger of ISAF and Enduring Freedom... but rather an **integration** –this is how the Ambassador put it in a recent interview on Cadena Ser– of Operation Enduring Freedom into the NATO operation» [bolding mine].<sup>37</sup>

■ Gustavo de Arístegui (spokesman for the People's Party group) «**One should combine and if possible merge** the missions of the USA's Enduring Freedom and ISAF (both with UN coverage [sic]) into a single one, for the sake of operational effectiveness and coordination. At the same time one it will likely be essential to increase current forces...» [bolding mine].<sup>38</sup>

**In Baghdis**, the province Spain is supposedly responsible for, there is, **an Enduring Freedom base with over 200 US troops**<sup>39</sup> fighting and bombing insurgents (and frequently civilians).

US forces consist almost entirely of troops in the Eastern Area controlled by ISAF, which is precisely the area with the greatest deployment of US Enduring Freedom troops. **It would be absurd to think that the US makes any internal operative distinction between ISAF and Enduring Freedom.** Even Germany recognizes that with 100 special forces and six Tornado aircraft in ISAF it is collaborating with Enduring Freedom.<sup>40</sup>

### EXPANSION OF ISAF



A US Congressional report says, «ISAF is considered by some as important not only from a security perspective but also from an economy of force perspective in that its existence permits the United States to focus the majority of its troops on combating Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents».<sup>41</sup>




**ARE THE PRT'S OUTSIDE THE DYNAMICS OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN?**

■ The PRT's are a creation of **Enduring Freedom** designed to win over the local population. The PRT's have been gradually transferred to ISAF (in fact in some case troops the very troops who were in the PRT's first training under Enduring Freedom and later under ISAF.

■ The PRT's are also used as **information-gathering centres** by the central government, the police, the intelligence services and **Enduring Freedom**.

■ The outline of operations in the summer of 2006 (when the country was not yet under ISAF control). Noteworthy is the link between the two operations (diagram based on a study by the Senlis Council):<sup>42</sup>



### 3. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN IS MILITARIZED AND NOT TARGETED AT MEETING THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION

**AID PROMISED, ALLOCATED AND MATERIALIZED** (in millions of dollars)  
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan<sup>43</sup> as of February 2008):

**Only 37.61% of aid promised to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2011 has materialized**

**Spain ranks 26th in aid materialized, only ahead of Turkey. It has only materialized 10.11% of financial aid promised**

	Donor	Aid materialized 2002-2008	Aid allocated 2002-2008 but not materialized	Aid promised 02-11 but not allocated or materialized	Percentage aid materialized 2002-2011 / promised
1	United States	5,022.90	5,377.00	12,389.10	22.04%
2	Japan	1,393.52	16.90	0.00	98.80%
3	United Kingdom	1,266.30	188.87	0.00	87.02%
4	European Commission	1,074.10	646.68	19.22	61.73%
5	World Bank	852.72	750.72	1,023.76	32.46%
6	Germany	767.84	458.20	0.00	62.63%
7	Canada	730.72	48.12	338.85	65.38%
8	Asian Dev. Bank	547.80	1,009.70	183.08	31.47%
9	Italy	424.41	0.00	0.00	100.00%
10	The Netherlands	407.10	85.50	0.00	82.64%
11	Norway	277.00	122.30	0.00	69.37%
12	Sweden	217.26	41.15	11.29	80.56%
13	Iran	213.87	13.89	126.24	60.42%
14	ECHO	207.68	2.23	58.29	77.43%
15	India	204.26	650.85	86.92	21.68%
16	Australia	194.81	0.00	27.55	87.61%
17	UN Agencies	171.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%
18	Denmark	152.79	59.38	63.03	55.52%
19	Russian Fed.	139.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%
20	Aga Khan	119.30	0.00	0.00	100.00%
21	France	79.93	29.47	0.00	73.06%
22	Saudi Arabia	76.90	30.00	113.10	34.95%
23	Finland	64.06	29.92	14.02	59.31%
24	Switzerland	51.55	43.96	0.00	53.97%
25	China	41.00	20.35	84.15	28.18%
26	<b>Spain</b>	<b>25.60</b>	<b>37.15</b>	<b>190.54</b>	<b>10.11%</b>
27	Turkey	20.80	22.82	46.38	23.11%
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14,744.22</b>	<b>9,685.16</b>	<b>14,775.52</b>	<b>37.61%</b>

**The combined contributions of all UN agencies, including development (UNDP), childhood (UNICEF), population (UNFPA) and food programmes (WFP), among others, from 2002 to 2006, totalled 265.5 million dollars, less than what is spent on the Spanish contingent in one year**

**UN contribution** (in millions of dollars):<sup>44</sup>

Year	Total	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	Others
2006	59.8			18.5	1.5	39.8
2005	55.3	7.1	4.9	17.1	–	26.3
2004	74.1	5.8	3.3	11.1	0.2	53.7
2003	31.7	0.6	6.0	14.5	1.5	9.0
2002	44.6	9.0	9.0	9.2	2.0	15.4
2001	27.2	3.9	0.8	9.0	6.7	13.6
2000	35	4.8	0.8	8.8	6.7	14.0

## Afghanistan is not an aid priority for Western countries

2005 (in millions of dollars):<sup>45</sup>

Donor Destination	TOTAL	US	Japan	UK	Germany	France	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Sweden	Spain	Others
Afghanistan	2,191.7	1,341.8	71.1	219.9	99.2	19.5	79.1	27.4	89.5	44.2	19.0	181.1
World	82,133.3	25,279.5	10,406.1	8,164.0	7,446.8	7,239.2	3,682.7	2,269.5	2,832.8	2,255.9	1,863.0	10,693.7
%	0.027%	0.053%	0.007%	0.027%	0.013%	0.003%	0.021%	0.012%	0.032%	0.020%	<b>0.010%</b>	0.017%

### Quality of aid<sup>49</sup>

■ Estimates are that 40% of aid (or some 6 billion dollars since 2001) has gone back to the donor countries in the form of salaries paid to consultants and profits for their companies (a private expatriate consultant receives between 250,000 and 500,000 dollars a year).

■ For reasons of communications, the Afghan government does not know what a third of the aid received since 2001 (some 5 billion dollars) was spent on.


■ Half of the aid is conditional, requiring the use of goods and services from the donor country.

■ Over two-thirds of international aid does not go through the Government of Afghanistan. Each country does funding through its own humanitarian agencies. This heightens the role and visibility of the donor but ignores local structures; donor «needs» are given priority and there are duplications of effort.

■ Profit margins for local and foreign companies on reconstruction contracts are generally about 20% but can reach 50%.


### Volume of aid to Afghanistan 2002-2008

(millions of dollars):<sup>50</sup>



### Military and civilian contributions to Afghanistan

(in millions of dollars):<sup>47</sup>



**Afghanistan was the leading recipient of arms from the US between 2006 and 2008<sup>48</sup>**

**92 of every 100 dollars contributed to Afghanistan by the entire rest of the world goes to military activities**

# 4. THE SPANISH CONTRIBUTION IS MILITARIZED RATHER THAN TARGETED AT MEETING THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION

*Afghanistan is a priority for the Spanish Government only in terms of military material*

2006 (in euros) <sup>51</sup>	Military funding going abroad	Funding humanitarian action	Funding, Official Development Aid
Total Spain 2006	458,361,979	247,700,000	6,518,421,053
Total Afghanistan 2006	272,351,709	800,000	14,429,687
% Afghanistan / total Spain 2006	59.42%	0.32%	0.22%

## Military and Civilian Financial Efforts by Spanish Government in Afghanistan:<sup>52</sup>

	Military Funding (euros) (ISAF + Enduring Freedom)	Total Civilian Funding (in parentheses implemented by army), in euros	Percentage military	Percentage (origin + destination)
2001	0	6,608,488 (0%)	0	0
2002	90,752,000	18,899,220 (90.9%)	82.76%	98.14%
2003	92,532,538	4,554,037 (67.27%)	95.31%	98.41%
2004	137,813,183	13,326,276 (94.3%)	91.18%	99.45%
2005	223,717,845	15,287,742 (48.36%)	93.60%	95.59%
2006	272,351,709	14,429,687 (0%)	94.97%	94.97%

## Spanish participation in military issues in Afghanistan:

### International funding for mine removal and related activities (2006) (in dollars):<sup>53</sup>

Country	Funding	Country	Funding
European Commission	32.663.800	Australia	2.008.578
US	14.714.000	Japan	1.808.972
Canada	6.613.500	Belgium	1.193.485
Slovakia	5.426.291	Finland	1.130.670
Germany	5.115.772	Czech Republic	928.320
Netherlands	4.458.835	Ireland	772.63
Denmark	3.366.000	<b>Spain</b>	<b>596.743</b> (in kind, to ISAF)
UK	2.292.474	Switzerland	399
Norway	2.001.566	France	8.29
Sweden	2.035.500	Total	87.534.418

Other countries have provided funding in kind: Lithuania, New Zealand and Poland

### Funding for DDR

(Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of combatants):<sup>54</sup>

Donors	Millions of \$	%
Japan	91.7	65
UK	19	13
Canada	16	11
US	9	6
Netherlands	4	3
Norway	0.8	1
Switzerland	0.5	<1
EC	0.1	<1
<b>Spain</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>141.1</b>	

*In the military area, Spain's contribution represented 0% of international DDR funding and only 0.68 % of total funding for mine removal and related activities*

## Contributions to humanitarian calls in 2008 (in dollars):<sup>55</sup>

Category	Date	Funding needed	Spanish contribution
Avalanches and heavy snowfalls	January 2008	3,417,158	0
Humanitarian consequences of rises in food prices	February-June 2008	81,321,254 (82% covered)	0
Joint emergency call for food price rises and drought	July 2008 – June 2009	404,319,728	0
Humanitarian contributions	2008	538,992,715 (25 donors)	0 <sup>56</sup>

## Spain's share of contributions to humanitarian crises (in dollars):<sup>57</sup>

Year	Total contributions for humanitarian crises	Spanish contribution	% Spanish contribution
2000	72,973,025	0	0
2001	5,502,062	0	0
2002	1,628,305,282	7,347,682	0.45
2003	457,075,826	0	0
2004	162,366,273	0	0
2005	80,174,325	588,963	0.73
2006	169,680,599	1,016,842	0.60
2007	174,879,518	0	0
2008	538,992,715	0	0
<b>Total 2000/08</b>	<b>3,289,949,625</b>	<b>8,953,487</b>	<b>0.27%</b>

*Though some indicators have improved, the situation of the population continues to be disastrous and progress has been minimal considering the huge spending amount of money spent on Afghanistan since 2002. The reason is simply that efforts have been aimed not at satisfying their needs but rather at serving the foreign military interests which have been given priority over humanitarian considerations*

## TODAY...<sup>59</sup>

6.6 million Afghan men and women (30% of the population) do not eat enough.

61% of households are below the food security threshold.

47% of boys and girls between 6 and years of age do not go to school, and in some provinces such as Zabul and Uruzgan, the figure is 99%.

For girls the rate of school attendance is half of that for boys at primary, secondary and higher educational levels.


## Trends in Indicators:<sup>58</sup>

Year	2002	2005	2006
Human Development Index	0.346	0.345	
Gender Development Index	0.30	0.31	
Human Poverty Index	59.3	62.3	
Life Expectancy (years)	44.5	43.1	
Adult Literacy	28.70%	23.50%	
Income per capita (dollars, PPP)	822	964	
Infant Mortality (per thousand births)	165	135	165
Population with access to drinkable water	23%	31%	23-39%
Low weight in child under 5	49%	54%	54%
Probability of not living until the age of 40	45.99%	41.90%	
Mortality in children under age 5 (per thousand births)	257	257	257
Combined enrolment	44.93%	59.30%	
Access to adequate water treatment	12%	7%	12%
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births)	1600	1600	1600
VDPT3 Vaccination (children below age 1)	31%		77%
Deliveries attended by qualified personnel	6%	8%	19%

# 5. VIOLENCE AND A LACK OF SECURITY HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY IN MUCH OF THE COUNTRY IN PART DUE TO THE FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION


Suicide bombings have always been extremely rare in Afghanistan. However, the occupation has brought about a sharp rise:<sup>61</sup>

**Suicide bombings in Afghanistan**



*The current number of refugees is similar to that of the Taliban and warlord periods*

**Afghan refugees (in millions of persons):<sup>62</sup>**



## INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT:<sup>63</sup>

■ Up until 2001 most of the 900,000 displaced persons were in the north and west of the country. In recent years almost 90% of the 160,000 displaced persons have been concentrated in the south, in Kandahar and Helmand.<sup>64</sup>

■ Now as before the principal cause of displacement has been drought rather than fighting even though

the latter can cause occasional mass displacement like the 300,000 new displacements caused by the 2001 intervention, the 80 to 90 thousand displacements between July and November 2006 resulting from fighting between NATO and US forces and insurgent groups, and the 600 thousand displacements of 1997 caused by fighting in Kabul and the north of the country.

*Between 2002 y 2007*

*Spain received 76 applications for asylum from Afghans. As of the end of 2007, only one had resulted in a granting of refugee status<sup>60</sup>*

Statements by the Agency for the Coordination of Afghanistan (ACBAR):<sup>65</sup>

■ **There is no enough funding to pay government forces** adequately. Armed conflicts among factions within the police and army are frequent.

■ The number of **revenge killings of civilians for collaboration** with the Afghan Government and foreigners has been increasing.



## DDR

(Demobilization, Disarming yand Reintegration)<sup>67</sup>

**Only the weakest groups have been disarmed. 63,380 combattants** have been demobilized (process completed), 57,629 light and 12,248 heavy weapons have been turned in. Estimates are that there are **still some 850 armed groups, with some 65.000 militiamen who have not participated in the process**, which has been manipulated and exploited by certain warlords.

The total budget for the DDR Process is **only 144.9 million dollars** for demobilizing some 100,000 combattants. This amount is quite low considering the military priority, even more so if we compare this with the amount for the deployment of Spanish troops, which is ten times as much. **Spain has not donated a single euro to the DDR Process.**

***In 2007 at least 1,977 civilians died a direct result of the conflict, of these 956 were caused by «armed opposition groups», 539 by international troops and 482 by «armed criminal groups». Between January and July of that year, most of the civilians died as the result of operations by international troops<sup>66</sup>***

## USE OF CLUSTER BOMBS

The United States admits having deployed 244,420 submunitions during the first three months of the air cam-

paign (2001). According to the UN, there are some **25,000 unexploded submunitions in the country.**<sup>68</sup>

## PROLIFERATION OF MILITARY, PRIVATE SECURITY AND ARM COMPANIES

The first group provide such services as passive protection, logistics, consulting, logistics, consulting, training and combat forces. Clients include diplomats, companies, armys, international agencies and NGO's. While the list is long, among the leading military companies are **Kellog Brown**

**& Root** (Halliburton Corp), **Dyn-Corp** and **L-3 Communications**. Among the arms companies, the most nimportant contracts have gone to **Lockheed Martin** and **General Dynamics**, which nows owns the formerly government-owned Spanish company **Santa Bárbara.**<sup>69</sup>

***The conflict in Afghanistan has spread to Pakistan, particularly to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where armed confrontations are on the rise***

## CRIMES COMMITTED BY MULTINATIONAL FORCES?

■ «Since 2001, thousands of Afghans and some non-Afghans have been arbitrarily detained, held incomunicado and been subjected to torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment by US forces or by armed groups acting under US control. Former Bagram detainees have claimed to have stripped, hooded, humiliated, handcuffed, and chained for days at a time, and forced into painful postures for hours at a time, and deprived of sleep». (Amnesty International, 1 March 2006).

■ «NATO have been accused by local people of participating in war crimes including unneces-

sary, disproportionate use of force (bombings and incursions), collective punishments, extrajudicial executions and inhumane, degrading treatment during detentions and arrests based on insufficient evidence. All parties to the conflict have committed violations of the humanitarian space and the principle of separating the civilian from the military. (ACBAR, 2006)

■ «The recent wave of fighting could be attributed more to American aggressiveness than to anything Al-Qaeda might be doing» (*Stars and Stripes, US military newspaper*).<sup>70</sup>

***The number of civilian deaths (collateral damages) caused by US and ISAF bombing are twice the number of deaths caused by the September 11 attacks in the US, which were used to justify the military intervention in Afghanistan<sup>71</sup>***

# 6. THE WEST HAS PROVIDED BOTH LEGITIMACY AND IMPUNITY TO MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO SHOULD BE TRIED

*Police forces in the provincial capitals, says ACBAR, are made up mainly of warlords<sup>74</sup>*

*Human Rights Watch estimates that some 60 % of legislators have links to the warlords, 20% have their own private militias, and at least another 20 have links to drug trafficking<sup>75</sup>*

## LEGITIMATE TO GOVERNMENT?

■ Before the presidential election of 2004, the US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (former advisor to the oil company Unocal) worked out an agreement with the other candidates to guarantee the victory of Hamid Karzai (suspected of also having previously been a Unocal advisor), who knew from the start he would win and enjoyed advantages far beyond those of the other candidates (pressure, helicopter trips all over the country, advertising, etc.). OECD and UN recommendations that elections be put off because minimum necessary conditions were not met were ignored.<sup>73</sup>

■ The alliances that have developed over the years among government officials, businesspeople, warlords, smugglers and arms and drug traffickers are very strong. This factor, added to US haste in forming the government and fears about the possible renewal of fighting, favoured the **inclusion of warlords in the Karzai Government** (many of them suspected of having committed war crimes) and turned Afghanistan back into much what it had been before the Taliban era.

## LEGITIMACY FOR «ONLY SOME» WARLORDS?

■ **«The war against terrorism»**  
The US supports, arms and funds Afghan warlords so that they will help capture Taliban and Al-Qaeda members in the east and southeast of the country all the while recognizing that the warlords are the main obstacle to the improvement of conditions for the population. Hamid Karzai himself has admitted that they represent a greater threat than the Taliban.<sup>76</sup> Only 5% of those detained at **Guantanamo** were captured by US troops while 86% were captured by Pakistani forces or the Northern Alliance frequently in exchange for thousands of dollars in rewards.<sup>77</sup> There is a strong feeling among the population that foreign forces have been using the warlords and other government officials to further their own strategic interests.

■ In May 2005 the head of the Peace and Reconciliation Commission offered all armed groups and their leaders a **general amnesty which in the end had no effect** perhaps on account of the initiative's lack of credibility. Among the candidates for amnesties were the warlord Hekmatyar and the Taliban Mullah Omar.

■ **The great majority of Afghan Army troops were originally from one ethnic group: the Tajiks of the Panjshir Valley.** Also from this group were Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance finally assassinated, as well as a significant proportion of the warlords and commanders today in the Government. This group is viewed with suspicion by other groups in the population. If the situation does not change, **the army may well come to be seen as just one more ethnic militia.**<sup>78</sup>



## CORRUPT GOVERNMENT?

■ Government corrupt is quite evident. A large number of warlords who work for the Government pursue an agenda different from that of national strategies and priorities. A new organized crime structure has been spreading at times even within the police force.

■ 75% of the money that comes from donor countries is channeled through parliamentary groups controlled by warlords or through private contractors.<sup>80</sup> Among the recent «high-priority» projects are a shopping centre and a five-star hotel in Kabul.

## NEW FREEDOMS?<sup>79</sup>

**Sayed Parwez Kambakhsh** was an Afghan journalism student at Balkh University (Mazar-e-Sharif) and journalist at the local daily Jahan-e-Naw (New World). In October 2007, at age 23 he was arrested on charges of downloading an article from the Internet on the role of women in Muslim societies. In January 2008 in a trial without a defence attorney, he was sentenced to death while the assistance prosecutor of Balkh Province warned other journalists that would be arrested if they supported Kambakhsh. In October 2008 an appeals court reduced the sentence to 20 years of imprisonment in a trial without guarantees of due process and full of irregularities. Kambakhsh has a right to further appeals. The European Parliament, various European governments, human rights organizations, the International Federation of Journalists and the UN have all interceded on behalf of the journalist. **The Spanish Government has remained silent.**

## WHAT SORT OF INFORMATION ARE WE RECEIVING?

In Afghanistan there are **at least 850 armed groups**<sup>85</sup> only some of which have links with the Taliban (and others indeed are fighting against them). Nevertheless, almost all armed attacks are, falsely, attributed to the Taliban. In some rural areas of the country, **the Taliban offer their services as protection against the warlords**. The Taliban enjoy support in their areas of origin. Most newspaper around the world printed Gulbudin Hekmatyar's claim of responsibility for the attack that killed 10 French soldiers on 18 August 2008 while attributing the incident to the Taliban (even calling Hekmatyar a «Taliban» even though this well-known warlord (and one-time prime minister under the Northern Alliance) has traditionally been at odds with the Taliban.

## THE GREAT HYDROCARBON GAME: WOULD THE TALIBAN REGIME HAVE BEEN GIVEN OFFICIAL RECOGNITION IF AFGHANISTAN HAD PETROLEUM?

The deputy to Mahmud Mestiri, former UN envoy to Afghanistan, was Charles Santos, political advisor to the US oil company **Unocal** and close to the US Administration. When it was been debated whether to pipe out Central Asia's oil and gas through Afghanistan (and Pakistan), Unocal suggested to the US Government it **officially recognize the Taliban** regime, the only group who could guarantee the stability necessary for building and managing an oil pipeline.<sup>81</sup> Then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said such recognition would depend on Taliban cooperation on the Bin-Laden issue.<sup>82</sup> On November 28, 1997 a Taliban delegation landed in Texas to visit Unocal in Sugarland. Later, they met with US State Department officials.<sup>83</sup> It has been claimed that Unocal withdrew from the area in the late 1990's under pressure from Washington. As a result of the instability of the country, Caspian Sea reserves are today piped out through other pipelines though one should bear in mind the agreement signed in December 2002 between Karzai and the Presidents of Pakistan and Turkmenistan for the construction of a gas pipeline through Afghanistan.

## MALALAI JOYA

(from a talk given 17 December 2003 by this member of the Afghan Parliament expelled by the Loya Jirga (assembly of elders) for criticizing the presence of warlords) with the following words:<sup>86</sup>

*... why are they permitting the legitimacy and legality of this Loya Jirga to be called into question because of the presence of the criminals who have led our country into the present situation?*

*... It is they who have turned our country into the source of national and international wars. In our society, they are women's greatest enemies. They have led the country into the current situation and they want to go on doing so.*

*I believe it is a mistake to try those who have already been tried. They should be brought before national and international courts. Though they are forgiven by the people, the barefoot Afghan people, our history will never forgive them. Their names have been engraved on the history of our country.*

# 7. THE PROBLEMS OF ABUSE AGAINST WOMEN AND OPIUM PRODUCTION, WHICH WERE USED TO JUSTIFY THE INTERVENTION, HAVE NOT IMPROVED.

*The change produced in Afghanistan in 2001 could have been marked a turning point in the living conditions of women. This has not been the case because no effort has been made to achieve this*

*Between 60% and 80% of marriages are forced; maternal death rates are high, with 1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births, one of the highest rates in the world; and the school attendance rate for girls in primary, secondary and higher education is approximately half that of boys, which itself is very low<sup>91</sup>*

## THE SITUATION OF WOMEN HAS NOT IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY

### Before the intervention

■ **The situation of women was disastrous.** Nevertheless, the only association usually made with the Taliban before the intervention was a simplistic, opportunistic one: the burqa and the ban on women working affected mainly urban areas (perhaps 10% of the total) and primary education had always been highly restricted. Women also wore burqas in the areas controlled by the Northern Alliance.

■ This is not to minimize the abuses against women, but rather to make clear that the leaders of **the Northern Alliance** that the West helped take power **behaved as despotically toward women as the Taliban.** In 1992 Rabbani, leader of the main party in the Northern Alliance, came to power. The new government gave in to conservative concerns and reversed measures implemented by the pro-Soviets. As demonstrated by Amnesty International,<sup>87</sup> measures introduced included amputation of hands and feet, flogging, hanging and stoning; all laws incompatible with Islamic «precepts» were revoked and Islamic courts were set up; restrictions were placed on freedom of speech, religion and association; books «contrary to the religion» were confiscated; non-Islamic parties were banned, participation in communal prayer was required and an Islamic dress code was imposed on women. On the other hand, the Taliban had ended a terrible period of rapes and robberies of women in Kabul and other cities, and had even banned forced marriages. In some areas the Taliban took measures to the extreme though.

### Since the intervention

■ **The situation of women is still disastrous.** Even though in some aspects (such as access to schooling and health care) the situation of women and girls has perhaps improved (such access is still limited by the general threat of violence), some organizations such as Womankind Worldwide have stated that «some forms of violence against women, such as honour killings, have increased; and that women living in many provinces are less safe than in 2001»<sup>88</sup> The number of female members of parliament has increased significantly (27.3% of the total) Still, many have links to the warlords<sup>89</sup> and, their presence is in no way proportional to their decision-making power, which are extremely limited.

■ Amnesty International<sup>90</sup> has reported that «**violence against women and girls in Afghanistan is permanent**». They live under the threat of «kidnapping and rape by armed individuals, forced marriages, being sold to settle disputes and debts; they suffer discrimination every day from all segments of society as well as government officials. Strict social codes, which claim to be based on tradition and religion, are used as justification for denying women the exercise of their basic rights and have led to the imprisonment of some women and indeed to killings».

## PRODUCTION AND TRADING OF OPIUM HAS INCREASED


### Before the intervention

■ Before September 11 there was alarm about the links between the Taliban and drugs. In fact, on 27 July 2000, the Taliban had banned and begun to prosecute opium production, following an agreement with the UN Drug Control Program, which the latter never complied with.<sup>92</sup>

■ In 2001 again, the production of pure opium was 94 % lower and covered 91% less area than in 2000. **In 2001, over 80% of the 185 tons of opium produced in Afghanistan was produced in areas controlled by the Northern Alliance.** According to UN agencies, only months before September 11, only between **200 and 400 million dollars would have been needed over the first three years** to end opium production.<sup>93</sup>

*In 2001, over 80% of the 185 tons of opium produced in Afghanistan was produced in areas controlled by the Northern Alliance*

### Opium production in Afghanistan<sup>94</sup>



### Production 2000-2001<sup>95</sup>

Province	Control (2001)	Hectares producing (2000)	Hectares producing (2001)
Helmand	Taliban	42,853	0
Nangarhar	Taliban	19,747	218
Badakhshan	Northern Alliance	2,458	6,342
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Taliban (90%)</b>	<b>84,500</b>	<b>7,606</b>

### Since the intervention

■ Eradication efforts, led by the UK, were designed from a military point of view. The British Government began an eradication program, but promises of aid and new seeds made to farmers in exchange for ending opium production never materialized.<sup>96</sup>

■ The Group for Aid to Afghanistan, a regular donor conference organized by the UN to coordinate aid to the country, has recognized the humanitarian drama caused by the reduction in production brought about by Taliban prohibi-

tion in 2000. Repressive eradication measures were taken without supporting changes to other means of livelihood through provision of land, seeds, grain for consumption and basic tools for one or two harvests. Programs aimed at revitalizing agriculture in Afghanistan have been tried several times, successfully. But there is a lack of incentives for switching crops.

■ Numerous members of Parliament and the Government, as well as officials in the «war on drugs», are involved in the opium business.<sup>97</sup>

### Trends in given indicators:<sup>98</sup>


	2005	2006	2007
Area under cultivation (ha)	104,000	165,000	193,000
Production (tons)	4,100	6,100	8,200
% of world opium production	87%	92%	92%
Number of households involved	309,000	448,000	509,000
Number of persons involved	2 million	2,9 million	3,3 million
Total value of exports (% GDP)	52%	46%	53%
Income from opium (dollars per ha)	5,400	4,600	5,200
Income from wheat (dollars per ha)	550	530	546
Eradication (ha)	5,000	15,300	19,047

*The Province of Badghis, where the Spanish PRT is located, was the sixth-ranking province (of 34) in opium production in 2007, with 4,219 ha*

# 8.

## MILITARY INTERVENTION IS A DANGER FOR TRADITIONAL HUMANITARIAN ACTION, WHOSE ACCESS TO THE POPULATION HAS BEEN REDUCED

### Humanitarian workers killed by violent attacks in Afghanistan<sup>101</sup>



Approximately 85% of deaths are among Afghans. The first lethal attack on an expatriate took place in 2003. In 2007, 89 humanitarian workers were kidnapped, and there were over 130 recorded attacks on humanitarian programs. For reasons of security, the UN does not work in 78 of the country's 376 districts.

### THE INTENTIONAL CONFUSING OF WHAT IS HUMANITARIAN AND WHAT IS MILITARY

■ Soldiers often carry out humanitarian tasks in civilian clothing (while still carrying weapons), which generates confusion among the local population and insurgent groups. Dutch soldiers for example are visibly differentiated from civilians and do not use the white Toyota all-terrain vehicles traditionally used by NGO's and humanitarian agencies as do the UK and Denmark.<sup>99</sup> The practice of not making a clear distinction allows them to integrate into the civil population. However, it also turns NGO's into military targets. The word «humanitarian» is used indistinctly by humanitarian and military groups, creating confused perceptions. As was pointed out by a Doctors without Borders press release of 28 July 2004, the killing of five of its workers on 2 June had not been an accident: a Taliban


spokesman assumed responsibility for the killings while claiming that groups like Doctors without Borders worked for US interests.

### Confusion promoted by governments<sup>100</sup>

■ Colin Powell, as US Secretary of State, said with reference to Afghanistan: Humanitarians are «multipliers and an essential part of the US combat team».

■ The Council of Europe, at a meeting in Helsinki, referred to humanitarian NGO's and ECHO as «resources» and «capabilities» at the service of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy.

### Humanitarian access – humanitarian workers at risk . Source: Afghanistan Conflict Monitor<sup>102</sup>



Whether justly or unjustly, local people have for years perceived links between some humanitarian groups and warlords and other local armed groups.

In Afghanistan, some local people clearly associate some warlords with certain NGO's.<sup>103</sup> This perception has increased as the armies have taken on their new role.

## DANGER FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION

■ Armies expected that by distributing aid they would win the trust of all least part of the population they assisted and deprive the «enemy» of legitimacy and support. Through these initiatives, however, the population tend to lose their civilian status and become participants in the war and consequently, military targets of the opposing faction.

■ Doctors without Borders has publicly denounced the Coalition strategy of dropping leaflets over the southern Afghanistan in which they ask the population to provide information regarding Taliban and Al-Qaeda members and threatened that if they did not do so the US Army would cease distributing aid.<sup>104</sup> On 8 November 2001 the Pentagon announced that it had

already dropped 16 million leaflets over Afghanistan (385 thousand of which were dropped in a single B-52 bomber operation (involving bombs and leaflets). Along with the food and leaflets, they also dropped various radio receivers<sup>105</sup> by means of which the population received various messages including calls to stop supporting the Taliban.

■ International norms (established by the Red Cross, UN agencies and humanitarian NGO's) require that armies participate in humanitarian tasks only when there is no civilian alternative. It must be a civilian group that determines that no such alternative exists and coordination must at all times be under civilian control, requirements that are not being respected in Afghanistan.

*The cloak of humanitarianism which the military has adopted in order to win over the local population with promises puts independent, impartial humanitarian action at risk. As a result, access is being limited, and, this limitation is harming the population, which in some places is left unattended*

## WHAT ABOUT THE DEPLOYMENT OF SPANISH SOLDIERS TO PROTECT HUMANITARIAN WORKERS? WHICH HUMANITARIANS?

In **Badghis Province**, where the Spanish Army operates, **only one international NGO maintains a regular presence**: the BRAC (of Bangladesh) but no Spanish NGO. The Spanish Government itself recommends against Spanish NGO's working in Afghanistan on account of the lack of security.<sup>106</sup>

Spain's official cooperation efforts are carried out, generally speaking, under **subcontracts given to the Spanish government company TRAGSA** by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation in Development (AECID).

**AECID personnel often cannot leave the PRT without an armed escort.** Security for humanitarians,

generally depends on one of two factors: **respect of armed groups for them** (in cases where they do not see humanitarian action affecting the dynamics of the war to their detriment); or **acceptance by the local population** which receives the aid (which, in cases of such acceptance will at the same time have the effect of limiting hostilities among armed groups).

For security reasons **reconstruction work had to be suspended in 2008 in almost half of Badghis Province** mostly in the north where Enduring Freedom operates.<sup>107</sup>

*The military should make an effort to remain distinct from humanitarian groups and vice versa so that everyone perceives this distinction*

## The declining presence of Spanish «NGO's» in Afghanistan (currently there is none where the Spanish PRT is located).<sup>108</sup>

Year	Number of projects	Total funding (in euros)	NGO
2005	14	1,550,930	4 (Federation SERSO, Red Cross, Unicef, Doctors without Borders)
2006	5	717,435	3 (Federation SERSO, Red Cross, Caritas)
2007	2	100,008	3 (Federation SERSO, Red Cross, Caritas)





## THERE IS NO ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT SPANISH TROOPS ARE DOING AND PUBLIC OPINION IS BEING IGNORED

Tariq Ali:<sup>114</sup>

*«While visiting Madrid after Zapatero's triumphal victory in March 2008, I was informed by an old government official that they had considered a total withdrawal from Afghanistan only a few months before the election, but the United States was a better strategist and made them the offer of proposing the head of their troops as commander of NATO forces, and a withdrawal from Kabul would have wasted the opportunity. Spain backed down, only to discover it had been tricked»*


### WHAT SORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? WHAT EXACTLY IS SPAIN DOING IN AFGHANISTAN?

**José Bono**, former Minister of Defence, has called the Spanish contribution a «peace mission».<sup>109</sup>

**Condoleezza Rice**, former US Secretary of State: «The [European] population should understand that this is not a peace mission».<sup>110</sup>

**Mariano Rajoy**, the leader of the People's Party (Spain), said that Spanish troops «were not going to apply band-aids or help little old ladies cross the street» but rather «they were going into a hostile operation».<sup>111</sup>

### Poll of Spanish population (November 2005):<sup>112</sup>




### Statements in the Congress of Deputies increasing Spanish troop levels (11 May 2006):<sup>113</sup>

- **Cuadrado Bausela** (Socialist faction): «It is not that there is a resolution authorizing this mission, rather it is the United Nations'. Our soldiers and our aid workers are under UN leadership [sic]...» «It is a UN mission, a United Nations mission [sic]».
- **Alonso Suárez**, Spanish Minister of Defence: «As civilian cooperation increases, resources for security must increase [sic]...» «Afghanistan has a geostrategic location which makes the intervention of the international community especially interesting and necessary».
- **Maldonado i Gili** (Convergència i Unió--CiU): «Why is CiU going to say yes to the Government's request?... In order to consolidate democracy, fight against terrorism and fight against the plague of drug trafficking [sic]...» «...there is drug trafficking, less than before, without a doubt [sic]».
- **Olabarría Muñoz** (Basque Group): «We would like this incorporation of new Spanish troops to be part of what you have mentioned, providing security to those who are there, and upholding the profound, essential, indeed legal, meaning of the mission of the Spanish troops sent to Afghanistan, of its humanitarian nature».
- **Llamazares Trigo** (Green-Left Group): «Without the ISAF operation, there would be no Enduring Freedom and without Enduring Freedom there would be no ISAF operation».
- **Mardones Sevilla** (Coalición Canaria): «...and this deputy would rather see our armed forces in the light and in the dark of the fields of Afghanistan than locked up in barracks in Spain. That is where they are needed... Minister, those which are needed, whether 150 or 300, because this is a service in the national interest».
- **Rodríguez Sánchez** (Mixed Group): «Enduring Freedom has extremely clear strategic objectives and at least indirectly it coincides with the role of ISAF in this imperial, strategic objective».

## WHAT DOES PUBLIC OPINION IN SPAIN AND ABROAD SAY?

**Spain.** Trends in Spanish public opinion regarding the presence of troops in Afghanistan<sup>115</sup>



### United States

In the US, in July 2008...<sup>116</sup>

... 59% agreed with sending additional troops to Afghanistan.


... 57% agreed with transferring troops from Iraq to Afghanistan.

The military effort is going... (02/08): <sup>118</sup>	
Very/fairly well	48%
Not very/not at all well	41%
Don't know	11%
The use of military force was the ...	
Right decision	65%
Wrong decision	24%
Don't know	11%

### Other countries. Opinion on intervention (Jul-Aug 2007)<sup>117</sup>

	UK	France	Italy	Germany	Canada
<b>A success</b>	16%	12%	18%	15%	22%
<b>A failure</b>	63%	63%	66%	69%	49%
<b>Not sure</b>	21%	25%	16%	16%	29%

¿Do you think the US was wrong to send troops to Afghanistan?<sup>119</sup>  
(US population)



## SHOULD FOREIGN TROOPS WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN?

**United States (February 2008):**<sup>120</sup>

Keep troops there	61%
<b>Withdraw troops</b>	<b>32%</b>
Don't know	7%

**Spain (2007):**<sup>121</sup>

	Elcano (March)	Opina (March)	Elcano (June)
<b>Withdraw</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>51,4%</b>	<b>49%</b>
Decrease	10%	Not asked	9,1%
Maintain	33%	20,8%	34,4%
Increase	5%	6,1%	3,1%

**Germany (May 2007):**<sup>122</sup>

<b>Withdrawal</b>	<b>63%</b>
Continuation	35%
Don't know	2%

**Canada (January 2008):**<sup>124</sup>

Should troops return home or remain?

	Total Canada	Countries	
		Quebec	Rest
<b>Withdraw as soon as possible</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>43%</b>
Continue fighting the Taliban	17%	11%	20%
Remain but transfer combat role to other NATO country	31%	31%	32%
Don't know	5%	1%	6%

**France (August 2008):**<sup>123</sup>

<b>Withdrawal</b>	<b>55%</b>
Continuation	36%
Don't know	9%

**United Kingdom (October- November 2008):**<sup>125</sup>

Should British troops in Afghanistan return home?

<b>Yes, they should return within the year</b>	<b>68%</b>
No, they should withdraw.	24%
Don't know	8%

# 10. THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES: 5 SUGGESTIONS FOR WHAT SPAIN'S AND (THE WORLD'S) CONTRIBUTION IN AFGHANISTAN MIGHT BE

## 1. GIVE PRIORITY TO NON-MILITARY MEASURES IN DEALING WITH THE CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN

■ In Afghanistan militarized measures have been encouraged from abroad based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even though **priority should be given to peaceful** means of settling disputes as Chapter VI requires.<sup>126</sup>

1. *The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.*

2. *The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.*

■ **There is no possible military solution.** There is a need to a broader perspective: there are non-military ways of contributing to a much more secure Afghanistan.

■ It is often said that there can be no development without peace but just as often one ignores the fact that **neither can there be security without development.**<sup>127</sup> One can change current priorities and establish more balanced practices. Even UNAMA recognizes that «**the major problem in Afghanistan today is poverty**».<sup>128</sup>

## 2. THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR PEACE ACCORDS AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING.

■ These accords should involve **all armed groups** (including the Taliban) **but first and foremost civilian representatives**, as well as **diplomatic exchanges with neighbouring countries** (including Iran) so as to keep them from again giving support to armed factions.

■ **The mediators must be not the US or other world powers** but rather a multilateral body respected by the parties and controlled by primary or secondary participants in the conflicts going on in Afghanistan.

■ If there is **sufficient political will and adequate funding** (redirecting the huge volume of foreign military spending in the country might be sufficient), an outcome satisfactory to the Afghan population could be achieved.

■ There is a pressing need for **investigating war crimes** committed (either in the present or at any point in the past) by any party to the conflict and starting a **reparations process for victims**. Such processes must be independent and dispose of sufficient resources and political support. At the same time there is a need to **strengthen the judicial system**, which without ignoring Afghan custom must be subject to extremist influence or political pressure from inside or outside the country.



### 3. THE PRIORITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL SHOULD BE RELIEVING THE POVERTY AND MEETING THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE POPULATION

■ **No real humanitarian call should go unattended.** Spain should change its current practice and commit itself to such emergency calls.

■ **There must be an end to conditional aid** tied to the economic interests of the donor country.

■ Nevertheless, **aid must not fall into the wrong hands.** The current Government, characterized by corruption and a lack of legitimacy, can provide no guarantees, so there is a need to improve accountability and transparency. At the same time, one needs to take into account the different regional governments and particularly, the numerous representative civil structures when channeling aid.

■ Rather military or repressive responses to opium production, **what is needed are alternative livelihoods for families who depend on the crop.**

■ There is a need for a **clear de-linking of humanitarian aid from the fights against terrorism and drugs, indeed from any other political goal.** Armed group should be clearly distinguishable from humanitarian aid workers. Existing agreements on the relationship between the military and humanitarians need to be respected, and there is a need to work out an agreement that defines a humanitarian space among all armed groups, local and foreign. Aid must not be focused on the areas with the greatest conflicts or be used for electioneering purposes in the run-up to 2009 presidential balloting.<sup>129</sup>

### 4. THERE IS A NEED TO STRENGTHEN REPRESENTATIVE CIVILIAN GROUPS AND NOT THE WARLORDS

■ In theory the function of international troops in Afghanistan is to help the Karzai Government and give it the legitimacy it lacked, even though it is infested with warlords, corruption, and individuals with strong ties to the parties in the conflict. The population cannot trust a government which it associates with the destruction of the country. **Foreign countries should end their support for local bosses** and permit an electoral process based on the country's traditions, without coercion or favouritism with a diversity of candidates (and not just ethnic diversity), including those critical of the foreign intervention. Centralism should not be imposed and nor should the Afghan population be kept from participating or taking decisions independently in accordance with its nature.

■ Relations between Afghans and foreigners follow **clearly colonialist patterns.** Local people handle day-to-day management but decisions are taken by foreign powers without consulting (official or popular) Afghan authorities in whom they have no trust. The West must stop making simplistic, disrespectful appeals to the presumed lack of capabilities of the numerous Afghan organizations and **empower, facilitate, legitimate and recognize the work they do on their own;** and reduce the huge disparity in income that tends to mean that the better educated end up working, sometimes in unskilled jobs. in international bodies working in the country, in foreign military structures and foreign NGO's (about a thousand).

### 5. THE US MILITARY, ENDURING FREEDOM AND NATO SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN

■ But first, **the huge number of weapons imported into the country from the West needs to be taken out of circulation** and the arms trade needs to be stopped. In addition **a more ambitious DDR** process should be implemented.

■ Foreign military actions are turning out to be counterproductive. **The US and NATO have committed war crimes** which have gone unpunished and often unrecognized.

■ **NATO is not an appropriate structure for managing Afghanistan's problems,** not even those which might be military issues, on account of its history, its motivations, its make-up and its attitudes and customs. **The objective of any international measure ought to be improving the Afghan population's living conditions, not serving the political and military interests of the countries involved, such as the US and its allies.**

■ **A good part of the population of Afghanistan has no faith in NATO or the US and considers them more and more as military occupation they oppose (and some fight against).** Now as ever, the object of international concern the population has not been the people, and the current obsession with military aspects is seen with skepticism inside and outside the country.

■ A replacement of foreign troops with **UN forces. Blue Helmets (could be equally harmful if the world powers merely pursue their line under a different hat** as happened in Somalia in 1993. It is questionable whether the UN can be involved in Afghanistan politically or militarily without being subject to Western interests.



## CONCLUSIONS

UNAMA recognizes that Afghanistan's main problem, now as it has been, is poverty. Nevertheless, international efforts are not being targeted at this issue but rather focus on the military dimension. The justification lies in the connection between security and development and a dogma that insists that one cannot be achieved without the other. But the enormous disparity between the two goals in terms of spending makes us doubt that the priority has ever been on satisfying the Afghan population's basic needs.

After more than seven years of an international obsession with the military dimension, we cannot say today that things have improved for the population. Afghanistan is a priority today, but as a destination for arms sales, as a foreign policy focus for many of the world's the most powerful countries, and as a place that gives NATO legitimacy. The country is not a major recipient of other kinds of international collaboration and, of the meager contributions for civilian purposes, a good part, we repeat, flows back to the donor countries while another part never goes through local structures or the Government, which is full of warlords, many of whom have been given legitimacy and support by the West.

It is disgraceful that in the Spanish Chamber of Deputies there are politicians who insist that Spain needs to be in Afghanistan in order to improve the plight of women, to eliminate opium trafficking, to put an end to terrorism or to change the terrible humanitarian situation in the country, while their efforts are aimed at meeting self interested commitments made

to the US and NATO. Spain's entry into the Atlantic Alliance compromised its military sovereignty and its freedom to decide what to do with its soldiers around the world. The sums offered for Afghan reconstruction are ridiculous and that fact that Madrid has met only 10% of even that commitment is true scandal.

Spain should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, but not forget the country. It must play a defining role in convincing other countries participating in Afghanistan to give priority to those measures which will improve the situation. To sum up then, first there must be an end to military incursions, bombing, and the obsession with capturing alleged terrorists. Second, there needs to be a move toward promoting dialogue among all the armed groups (without the intervention of mediators with their own interests in the conflict) with priority being given to conversations with their base of support among the population, with the numerous groups in civil society thus far ignored, and diplomatic exchanges with neighbouring countries which could serve to bring to an end their long standing, harmful interference in Afghan affairs through support for various factions. Third, there is a need for a show of sincere commitment via real cooperation and an effort to see that basic needs (in broadest sense) of the population are met. Afghanistan's annual GDP is estimated to be only about 7 billion dollars, one fifth of current military spending on the US Army alone. This is not a matter of financial resources. There are many non military ways to contribute to a far more secure Afghanistan.

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# REPORTS

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